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Elite Influence on Climate Change Skepticism:
Evidence from Close Gubernatorial Elections
Andrew G. Meyer

Department of Economics, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

Abstract

Many theorize that public opinion follows political elite on climate change skepticism, yet evidence of a
causal link is lacking. I use a regression discontinuity design to establish the impact of the political party
of a governor on constituents’ global warming beliefs. I find that, relative to the election of a
Democratic governor, the election of a Republican governor significantly decreases the probability of a
Republican constituent believing in global warming by approximately 11–15 percentage points; there is
no significant impact on Democratic constituents. I also find a negative effect of a Republican governor
on belief in human-caused global warming that does not differ by constituent partisan affiliation. These
results provide one explanation for the increased political polarization in global warming beliefs
despite the scientific consensus. Belief formation often plays an important role in political economy
models, so these findings also have implications for implementing climate change policy.

Recent polls reveal that a majority of US adults are concerned about climate change.1 For example, a
March 2016 Gallup poll finds that 64% of US adults say they are worried a “great deal” or “fair amount”
about global warming (Gallup 2016) and a 2016 Pew Research Poll finds that 74% of US adults care “a
great deal” or “some” about the issue of global climate change (Pew Research Center 2016). Yet, there
are substantial differences in climate change beliefs and concern across segments of US society;
individual party affiliation is recognized as one of the particularly strong predictors of climate change
beliefs (e.g., Borick and Rabe 2010; Hornsey et al. 2016; Egan and Mullin 2017). Moreover, research
suggests that political polarization on climate change has increased over recent years (e.g., Dunlap and
McCright 2008; McCright and Dunlap 2011).2 In contrast to the political polarization, there is a strong
consensus in the scientific community that climate change is real. According to the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), climate change has caused widespread impacts on human and natural
systems, continued greenhouse gas emissions will cause further warming and changes to the climate
system,3 and limiting climate change risks would require substantial reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions (IPCC 2014).
Why is it that political polarization on climate change has increased when the scientific consensus is
clear? In this paper, I provide one potential explanation; climate change platforms and policies of the
political elite impact the climate change beliefs of their constituents. Specifically, I find that party
affiliation of political leaders differentially affects the climate change beliefs of individuals identifying
with the Republican versus Democratic party.4 This finding is consistent with the Druckman et al.
(2013) experimental evidence that elite partisan polarization—high levels of homogeneity within
elected representatives of a party and high levels of ideological differences across elected
representatives of parties—increases the impact of party endorsements on public opinion and lessens
the importance of substantive information.
Economists have a long-standing interest in belief formation.5 Beliefs often play an important role in
theoretical political economy models and can specifically impact chosen levels of environmental
regulation (e.g., Yu 2005). Moreover, there are efficiency implications if political communication instills
inaccurate beliefs in constituents. DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010, 644) argue that “the efficiency of
market economies and democratic political systems depends on the accuracy of individuals’
beliefs.”6 Voters will be ill equipped to judge climate change policies if their beliefs contradict the
scientific evidence. As framed by Millner and Ollivier (2016, 226), “the beliefs of the general public are
‘ground zero’ for the battle to implement environmental policies.” Furthermore, “the process of social
belief formation, and its consequences for the political economy of environmental policy, should be an
integral part of the positive study of environmental regulation” (Millner and Ollivier 2016, 227).
Economists should therefore care about public opinion on climate change because, despite the
economic arguments in favor of climate change policy, it may be difficult to enact policy against the
headwind of public opposition.
Estimating the impact of political elite opinion on mass opinion is empirically challenging. Absent a
credible identification strategy, we would be concerned about endogeneity because areas that vote for
Republican representatives could be quite different along many unmeasured dimensions as compared
to areas that vote for Democratic representatives. I circumvent these endogeneity concerns by

leveraging close gubernatorial election outcomes to identify how the governor’s political party affects
mass opinion. The regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimates the causal effect of a Republican
gubernatorial win on the probability that a constituent believes there is solid evidence of global
warming, relative to the counterfactual of a Democratic gubernatorial win. This identification strategy
originates with Lee (2001, 2008) and has been utilized elsewhere in the literature to determine the
causal impact of elections (e.g., Leigh 2008; Beland 2015; Doyle et al. 2016). The intuition is that, if the
political party of the winning candidate has no bearing on constituent global warming beliefs, then
constituent global warming beliefs should not change discontinuously at the threshold between
gubernatorial races that narrowly had Republican winners versus those that narrowly had Democrat
winners.
I match multiple waves of the National Surveys on Energy and Environment (NSEE) from 2008 to 2015
with gubernatorial election results to generate a sample of US individuals from all 50 states. I first
estimate local linear regressions with bias correction and optimal bandwidth, as suggested by de la
Cuesta and Imai (2016), Gelman and Imbens (2017), and Skovron and Titiunik (2015). When using the
overall sample, I find consistent negative point estimates for the effect of a Republican gubernatorial
win on global warming beliefs of constituents, but the estimates are not statistically significant.
However, I do find evidence of significant heterogeneity in the treatment effect; a Republican
gubernatorial win significantly decreases the probability of a Republican constituent believing in global
warming by approximately 11–15 percentage points whereas there is no significant effect of a
Republican win on the global warming beliefs of Democrat constituents.7 I then use several
specifications to formally test for differential effects on constituents of different party affiliations.
Here, I confirm that the effect of a Republican gubernatorial win on climate change beliefs is
significantly stronger for Republican constituents than for Democratic constituents. In the preferred
specification, Republican individuals are approximately 11 percentage points less likely to believe in
climate change relative to Democratic individuals when a Republican candidate wins a close
gubernatorial election. However, on the issue of anthropogenic climate change, I find a negative and
significant treatment effect for the overall population; the effect of a Republican gubernatorial win on
human-caused global warming beliefs does not differ by political identification of the respondent.
I make several important contributions with this paper. While some have theorized that the public
follows the lead of the political elite on climate change, Egan and Mullin (2017, 220) note that
“scholars have not identified a direct causal link between climate change skepticism campaigns and
individual attitudes.”8 Thus, the most important contribution is that I provide causal evidence that the
climate change stance of a political leader impacts climate change beliefs of constituents. This finding
has important implications for how climate change skepticism could persist into the future despite the
scientific evidence. A second contribution is that I provide new quasi-experimental evidence that
political communication impacts opinion in general. Many earlier papers find a strong correlation
between political communication and opinion. However, with some exceptions, most of the extant
empirical evidence lacks credible identification strategies and should thus be interpreted as
correlational (Gabel and Scheve 2007; DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010).9 A third contribution is to the
growing literature on the impacts of political ideology; there is growing evidence that political ideology
affects the extent of one’s pro-environmental behavior.10

There is a political divide among elected representatives along partisan lines with regard to
environmental issues.11 Republican governors typically deny climate change while Democratic
governors accept the science of climate change. A 2014 report categorizes the nation’s governors into
four groups according to their climate change beliefs (Koronowski 2014). At the time of the report, only
Democrats were labeled as “green” for proactively implementing climate change policies. Moreover,
“fifteen out of twenty nine sitting Republican governors openly deny climate science”
(Koronowski 2014). That is, over half of Republican governors in 2014 were categorized as “climate
deniers.” In contrast, “None of the country’s Democratic governors have made public statements
denying climate change” (Koronowski 2014). While there are several exceptions during the sample
period, almost all Republican governors either deny climate change or remain silent on the issue.12
Given the partisan divide in climate change positions of the political elite, there must be a plausible
transmission mechanism to claim that I identify the impact of political elite on constituents’ climate
change beliefs. More generally, there is theory and evidence that political communication influences
individuals’ political opinions. When confronted with a complex issue such as climate change,
individuals tend to look for cues from the political elite to form an opinion.13 Rugeley and Gerlach
(2012) argue that individuals adopt the climate change positions of political elite to mitigate
informational costs of understanding complex scientific issues. As summarized by Egan and Mullin
(2017, 217), “the complex scientific content on the climate change issue can make it difficult for
individuals to form their own judgments about the accuracy of climate science or the potential impacts
of climate policy, leading most to look to partisan elites for information about the quality of evidence
and the likely effects of policy proposals.”
Although the literature on elite leadership of public opinion has not focused much on governors,
previous literature does suggest that a governor’s stance on an environmental issue could matter.
Research dating to Hinckley et al. (1974) shows that voters are quite familiar with gubernatorial
candidates. Squire and Fastnow (1994) show that governors get more media coverage than US
senators and voters are more familiar with governors than US senators: “Indeed, it is likely that among
elected officials, only the president and vice president are better known than the governor” (Squire
and Fastnow 1994, 708). Atkeson and Partin (2001) find that, relative to US senators, governors focus
more on developmental concerns such as the environment. Furthermore, previous research shows
that simply adopting positions can be enough to sway voters’ opinions (Broockman and Butler 2017).
So, governors’ positions on the environment and climate change could influence public opinion, even if
governors are not regularly engaging in active debate about climate change.
Moreover, there is reason to expect that the political opinion impact may be moderated by the
political affiliation of the constituent. Studies show that education and scientific knowledge positively
correlate with belief in climate change for Democrats but have weak or even negative correlation for
Republicans (Malka et al. 2009; McCright and Dunlap 2011; Guber 2013; Kahan 2015; Egan and
Mullin 2017). The implication is that providing scientific information about climate change may have
differential effects on Democrats and Republicans. Also, multiple studies find evidence of partisan
contrasts in the effectiveness of communicating with different frames, with frames typically having
larger impact for Republican opinion than for Democrat opinion (Hardisty et al. 2010; Gromet et

al. 2013; Egan and Mullin 2017). Thus, prior evidence provides reasons why Republicans could be more
susceptible to persuasion from political elite on the issue of climate change.

1. Data

This study requires merging survey responses on global warming beliefs with gubernatorial election
information. Consistent with Beland (2015), I obtain gubernatorial election results from Leip’s Atlas of
US Presidential Elections (2017). I include all elections from all 50 states where either a Democrat or a
Republican won; elections with an Independent winner are not included. Apart from New Hampshire
and Vermont,14 governors serve 4-year terms.15 Gubernatorial elections typically take place in
November with the winner taking office in January. Therefore, I link the election results from
November of year t with global warming beliefs from individuals in that state from years 𝑡𝑡 + 1 to 𝑡𝑡 +
4.16 Governors sometimes leave office early for a variety of reasons. If their replacement takes power
without an election and is of the same political party, I keep the corresponding observations in the
sample. However, in the rare case that the replacement belongs to a different party, the corresponding
observations are excluded from analysis. If there is a special election to determine the replacement, I
use the results of the special election for the remainder of the term until the next election.
Data on individuals and their global warming beliefs come from multiple waves of the National Surveys
on Energy and Environment (NSEE). The NSEE include twice per year national opinion surveys on issues
related to energy, the environment, and climate change. The NSEE are a collaborative effort between
the Muhlenberg Institute of Public Opinion at Muhlenberg College and the Center for Local, State, and
Urban Policy (CLOSUP) at the University of Michigan’s Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy. Published
in July 2017, version 12 of the NSEE project covers the time period of 9/2/2008 to 9/24/2015 (Rabe and
Borick 2017).17 Each of the 14 waves contain data on approximately 600–900 respondents; 87.5% of
respondents provide an answer to the survey question about global warming beliefs, and 90.6% of
respondents provide an answer to the survey question about political affiliation. Each wave of the
NSEE surveys ask respondents, “Which of the following best describes your political party affiliation?”
The options are: Democrat, Republican, Other Party, Independent, or Not Sure. Counting only
individuals who provide their global warming beliefs, have a Democratic or Republican governor, and
report their individual political affiliation, there are 8,756 observations from all 50 states.18 A small
number of individuals do not report race/ethnicity and are excluded from the main sample.19 As such,
the main sample for analysis contains 8,680 observations.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main sample and for the US population as a comparison. As
seen in Table 1, all demographic groups are represented in the NSEE. However, the sample contains a
relatively higher proportion of white/Caucasian respondents and relatively lower proportions of
racial/ethnic minorities, as compared to the US population.20 As such, I control for race/ethnicity in the
regressions of section 2. Also, the NSEE sample is older and more highly educated than the US
population at large; I therefore show specifications where I control for age and education.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the NSEE
Variable
Global warming belief
Race/ethnicity:

Sample Mean US Population
.709
NA

White/Caucasian
.814
.769
African American
.0749
.133
Asian
.0262
.057
Hispanic/Latino
.0469
.178
Mixed race and other
.0381
.039
Male
.482
.492
College educated
.485
.303
Age 45 or older
.695
.534
Governor political affiliation:
Democrat
.47
NA
Republican
.53
NA
Individual political affiliation:
Democrat
.385
.29
Republican
.296
.26
Independent
.319
.42
Global warming belief by individual political affiliation:
Democrat
.853
NA
Republican
.52
NA
Independent
.711
NA
Note. Sample means are from author’s calculations. US population statistics are from the US census
(2016). NSEE = National Surveys on Energy and Environment.

The exact wording of the global warming belief question is “From what you’ve read and heard, is there
solid evidence that the average temperature on earth has been getting warmer over the past four
decades?” (Rabe and Borick 2017). Approximately 71% of the sample answer “yes” to this question.
There is an apparent correlation between global warming belief and individual political affiliation. As
shown in Table 1, over 85% of Democrats believe in global warming, around 71% of Independents
believe in global warming, and 52% of Republicans believe in global warming.

2. Empirical Strategy and Results

This paper seeks to identify the impact of a governor’s political party on the global warming beliefs of
constituents. Gubernatorial election outcomes are potentially endogenous to global warming beliefs.
There are many unobserved characteristics of gubernatorial candidates and states, correlated with
election outcomes, that also affect constituent behavior and beliefs. Thus, I adopt the RDD
identification strategy, which uses outcomes of close elections as a quasi-experiment. The use of the
RDD for identification of the effects of election outcomes stems from Lee (2001, 2008) and has been
applied in papers such as Lee et al. (2004), Petterson-Lidbom (2008), and Ferreira and Gyorko (2009).
Beland (2015), Beland and Boucher (2015), Beland and Oloomi (2017), Beland and Unel (2018), and
Leigh (2008) utilize the RDD specifically in the context of gubernatorial elections. Before presenting
regression results, I first provide some graphical evidence of the discontinuity.

2.1. Graphical Evidence

Define the margin of victory as the difference between the election vote share received by the
Republican and Democratic candidates. Then, a positive margin of victory signifies that the Republican
candidate won the election and the RDD threshold is defined where the margin of victory for a
Republican governor is 0%. Figure 1 shows RD plots for the probability that a respondent believes in
global warming. Each plotted point represents the proportion of individuals who believe in global
warming within each margin of victory bin. Figure 1A–1D fits linear functions on both sides of the RD
threshold using only data from elections within the Calonico et al. (2018) optimal bandwidth and thus
provides a graphical representation of the local linear regressions reported in the next subsection,
2.2.21 Panel A includes all respondents, panel B includes only self-identified Democratic respondents,
panel C includes only self-identified Republican respondents, and panel D includes only Independent
respondents.

Figure 1. RD plot of vote margin versus global warming beliefs: optimal bandwidth. Positive vote margin
indicates Republican governor. All respondents are included in panel A. Only Democrat respondents are in
panel B. Only Republican respondents are in panel C. Only Independent respondents are in panel D.

In figure 1A, there is a small discontinuity in the proportion of respondents believing in climate change
when crossing the RD threshold. Visually, a Republican win decreases the probability of a respondent
believing in global warming by approximately 2 percentage points for this overall sample. Figure
1B shows that there is little change in the probability of a self-identified Democrat respondent
believing in global warming when a Republican governor wins. Figure 1C indicates that there is a larger
drop in the probability of a self-identified Republican respondent believing in global warming when a
Republican governor wins a close election; the magnitude of the discontinuity at the RD threshold is
approximately 10 percentage points.
Figure 1C exhibits visual decreases in the bin averages just to the right of the threshold (close
Republican wins) versus those just to the left of the threshold (close Democratic wins), so it is worth
describing the states and individuals represented in these bins.22 States from various geographic
regions (East vs. West, North vs. South, etc.) are represented in these closest elections. Also, multiple
states appear in the sample as both close Democratic wins and close Republican wins. Table A1 reports
on tests for differences in proportion of male, college educated, white, older, conservative, Republican,
Democrat, and Independent respondents for individuals just below the threshold (−6 ≤ vote margin <
0) versus individuals just above the threshold (0 < vote margin ≤ 6). I do not find any significant

differences in the proportions of individuals holding these characteristics based on treatment status.
Therefore, individuals represented in the states having close vote margins appear similar on observable
characteristics, suggesting that they are likely to also be similar on unobservable characteristics. As
emphasized by de la Cuesta and Imai (2016) and Skovron and Titiunik (2015), the continuity
assumption—necessary for the RD design in this paper—does not require covariate balance based on
treatment status. It only requires that the expected potential outcome does not discontinuously jump
at the threshold. Thus, the covariate balance seen in Table A1 lends additional credibility to the design
but is not required for identification.23
Finally, figure 1D shows a smaller increase in the probability of a self-identified Independent
respondent believing in global warming when a Republican governor wins a close election. The
magnitude of the increase is about 4.5 percentage points for Independent respondents. While these
plots of the raw data are informative, I next present estimates from regressions that condition on
several baseline covariates and facilitate inference on the RD treatment effects of interest.

2.2. Local Linear Regressions with Bias Correction

The RD treatment effect is the difference between the expected proportion of respondents believing in
global warming given a Republican election win and the expected proportion of respondents believing
in global warming given a Democratic election win at the RD threshold (vm0). However, since there are
no treatment or control observations exactly at vm0, one must use observations close to vm0 for
estimation. The first step of local linear estimation is therefore to choose the bandwidth, h, for
estimation; only observations within this bandwidth are used to fit linear regression functions on both
sides of the threshold. As recommended in the literature, I use an optimal bandwidth that minimizes
the mean squared error (MSE) of the local linear estimator (Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012; Calonico
et al. 2014b; Skovron and Titiunik 2015; de la Cuesta and Imai 2016; Gelman and Imbens 2017). As is
standard, I primarily utilize a triangular kernel,24 which weights observations closer to the RD threshold
more heavily. Because the nonparametric local polynomial approach approximates an unknown
functional form near the threshold, there is a bias that arises in the estimator.25 A bias-correction
procedure estimates the bias term and subtracts it from the RD point estimate. Calonico et al.
(2014a, 2014b) provide methods to conduct inference on RD estimates that account for the bias term.
Therefore, as recommended by de la Cuesta and Imai (2016), and Skovron and Titiunik (2015), I show
results using the robust inference of Calonico et al. (2018) for all bias-corrected estimates.26 For
completeness and transparency, I also show conventional (not bias-corrected) parametric point
estimates with standard errors clustered at the state level (conventional RD inference).27 Hereafter, I
refer to the bandwidth and estimation procedures of Calonico et al. (2018) as “Calonico et al.”
Table 2 presents the baseline RD results.28 Each of these columns include survey year fixed effects to
improve precision. Columns 2, 4, and 6 also include the baseline covariates of race/ethnicity and
gender. The first two columns show results for the full sample. While the point estimates suggest that
Republican governors decrease the probability of a respondent believing in global warming, the
estimates are not significant at conventional levels. Likewise, I do not find statistical evidence of a
Republican governor impacting the global warming beliefs of Democratic respondents in columns 3
and 4. However, when limiting the sample to Republican respondents only in columns 5 and 6, I find
large and statistically significant effects. The preferred bias-corrected estimate in column 6 indicates

that, relative to the counterfactual of a Democratic governor, a Republican governor decreases the
probability of a Republican respondent believing in global warming by approximately 14.5 percentage
points.
Table 2. Baseline Local Linear RD Results: Global Warming Is Real

Conventional
Bias corrected
robust

Full
Sample
(1)
−.0208
(.0189)
−.0212

Democrat
Respondents
(2)
(3)
−.0242 −.0268
(.0184) (.0398)
−.0251 −.0259

Republican
Respondents
(4)
(5)
−.0246 −.114**
(.0398) (.0487)
−.0242 −.131**

(6)
−.128***
(.0455)
−.145***

(.0229)

(.0222) (.0464)
X

(.0463) (.0580)
X

(.0558)
X

Race/ethnicity and
gender
BW estimation
8.620
8.391
9.298
9.230 9.598
9.848
BW bias
18.267
17.992 16.456
16.596 18.345
20.255
Observations
8,680
8,680
3,342
3,342 2,573
2,573
Effective
2.769
2,759
1,214
1,174 923
959
observations
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for conventional RD (regression discontinuity)

estimates are clustered at the state level. Standard errors for bias corrected RD estimates are Calonico et al.–
robust, clustered at the state level. All specifications include year fixed effects and use the triangular kernel.
“Effective observations” refers to the number of observations within the estimation bandwidth (BW).
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.

2.3. RD Specifications on the Pooled Data to Test for Differential Effects

I next present results from parametric RD specifications on the pooled data because these
specifications facilitate straightforward hypothesis testing for differences between groups. In the
present context, one can easily test whether the discontinuity differs for Democrat versus Republican
respondents. Also, these specifications facilitate the inclusion of additional baseline covariates such as
state fixed effects; this can reduce the residual variance and produce more precise estimates.
Denote the vote margin in state s in year t as VMst, where positive values indicate the election of a
Republican governor and negative values indicate the election of a Democratic governor. The
discontinuity therefore occurs at VMst=0VMst=0. The baseline RD specification is
GW𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 RG𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽2 RP𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 RG𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ⋅ RP𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 IP𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 RG𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ⋅ IP𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .
+𝑓𝑓(VM𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ) + 𝑓𝑓(VM𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ) ⋅ RP𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓(VM𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ) ⋅ IP𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 + 𝜁𝜁𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

The outcome variable, GWist, is an indicator for belief in global warming. The variable RGst is an
indicator for a Republican governor holding office in state s in year t, RPist is an indicator for an
individual i residing in state s in year t who reports a Republican party affiliation, IPist is an indicator for

an individual who self-reports as Independent in their party affiliation, Xist includes individual
characteristics such as race/ethnicity and gender, ψt are year fixed effects, and ζs are state fixed
effects. The continuous relationship between vote margin and global warming belief is captured
with f(VMst), which is a linear function of vote margin (allowed to take on different slopes on each side
of the discontinuity). The linear function of vote margin is also interacted with the individual-level
political affiliation variables to allow for different trends based on self-identified political affiliation.
The coefficients β1, β3, and β5 are the main parameters of interest, as they represent the differential
effects of a Republican governor on the global warming beliefs of individuals of different party
affiliations. Note that, because all individuals in the sample self-report a political affiliation of
Democrat, Republican, or Independent, β1 represents the impact of a Republican governor on the
global warming beliefs of a Democratic individual. Coefficient β3 represents the differential effect of a
Republican governor on the global warming beliefs of a Republican individual, relative to a Democratic
individual. Likewise, β5 represents the differential effect of a Republican governor on the global
warming beliefs of an Independent individual, relative to a Democratic individual. Therefore, the
overall effect of a Republican governor on the global warming beliefs of a Republican individual is 𝛽𝛽1 +
𝛽𝛽3, and the overall effect of a Republican governor on the global warming beliefs of an Independent
individual is 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽5.

As a baseline in Table 3, I use linear controls and the Calonico et al. optimal bandwidth.29 I do not find
any evidence across specifications that the election of a Republican governor affects the global
warming beliefs of Democratic constituents. However, consistent with the bias-corrected results on the
partisan subsamples from section 2.2, I do find evidence that the election of a Republican governor has
a differential effect on Republican constituents. The preferred specification (1) with state fixed effects,
year fixed effects, race/ethnicity controls, and gender controls indicates that the election of a
Republican governor decreases the probability of a Republican constituent believing in global warming
by approximately 11 percentage points, relative to a Democrat constituent. The overall impact of a
Republican governor on Republican constituents is an approximate 8.5 percentage point drop in the
probability of global warming belief. Columns 2–4 show that this differential effect is not sensitive to
the chosen baseline covariates and fixed effects.
Table 3. RD Specifications for Differential Effects: Global Warming Is Real
Republican Governor (RG)
RG × Rep. Individual
RG × Ind. Individual
Rep. Individual
Ind. Individual
Male

(1)
.0274
p = .454
−.113***
p = .004
.0129
p = .788
−.263***
p = .002
−.125***
p = .002
−.0387**
p = .014

(2)
.00698
p = .886
−.100**
p = .022
.0342
p = .57
−.268***
p = .002
−.133***
p = .002
−.0423**
p = .014

(3)
.0247
p = .516
−.0969***
p = .010
.00194
p = .956
−.266***
p = .002
−.119***
p = .002
−.0443**
p = .012

(4)
.0117
p = .786
−.0983**
p = .032
.0246
p = .662
−.268***
p = .002
−.127***
p = .002
.
.

State fixed effects
X
X
Year fixed effects
X
X
Race/ethnicity and gender X
X
X
Additional controls
X
Observations
3,512
3,512
3,462
3,512
No. of clusters (states)
34
34
34
34
Note. p-values are generated using the wild bootstrap procedure from Cameron et al. (2008).
Clustering is at the state level. All specifications include linear controls and use the optimal bandwidth
of 10.051.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
While not the focus of this paper, I note that individuals reporting Republican partisan affiliation have a
substantially lower baseline probability of believing in global warming relative to Democratic
individuals. A Republican survey respondent is 26.3 percentage points less likely to believe in global
warming as compared to Democratic respondents. For reference, the unconditional probability of a
Democratic individual in the sample believing in global warming is 0.853. Thus, the election of a
Republican governor serves to further decrease the likelihood of global warming belief among a
subgroup that already has a significantly lower baseline probability of believing.

2.4. Validity Checks and Falsification Tests

Several papers have called into question the appropriateness of the RDD in the context of close
elections (Snyder 2005; Caughey and Sekhon 2011; Grimmer et al. 2011). However, another set of
papers argue that the assumptions behind the RDD are likely met in most close election settings and
provide recommendations for researchers applying the method (Eggers et al. 2015; Skovron and
Titiunik 2015; de la Cuesta and Imai 2016). Here, I conduct the validity checks and falsification tests
recommended by these papers.
First, as suggested by de la Cuesta and Imai (2016), I estimate local linear regressions where I replace
the dependent variable of global warming belief with other baseline covariates that should not change
discontinuously at the threshold. Table 4 reports these falsification tests for the baseline covariates of
white/Caucasian, age 45 or older, male, and college educated. I use the optimal bandwidth calculation
from Calonico et al. for each falsification test.30 As seen in Table 4, I do not find evidence of
discontinuous changes in any of the predetermined covariates at the threshold; this supports the
validity of the RD design.31
Table 4. Falsification Tests: Local Linear RD
Outcome

White Age 45 or Older Male
(1)
(2)
(3)

Conventional

−.00708 .0165

−.0386 .0321

(.0535) (.0302)

(.0319) (.0388)

Bias corrected robust −.00614 .0236

College
(4)

−.0473 .0451

Outcome

White Age 45 or Older Male
(1)
(2)
(3)

College
(4)

(.0612) (.0316)

(.0366) (.0417)

BW estimation

10.479 8.724

10.825 11.008

BW bias

17.188 19.806

18.166 22.920

Observations

8,680

8,680 8,664

8,603

Effective observations 3,585 2,739
3,676 3,669
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for conventional RD estimates are clustered at the

state level. Standard errors for bias-corrected RD estimates are Calonico et al.–robust, clustered at the state
level. All specifications include year fixed effects and use the triangular kernel. “Effective observations” refers to
the number of observations within the estimation bandwidth (BW).
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.

The null results on the local linear regressions reported in Table 4 show that there are no discontinuous
changes in baseline covariates for the overall sample. However, the main result in this paper concerns
differential effects for Republican versus Democratic individuals when a Republican governor is
elected. Therefore, I also conduct falsification tests using the specification given in
equation (1) (replacing global warming belief with the baseline covariates). As shown in Table 5, I do
not find significant estimates for the coefficients on Republican Governor (β1) or Republican Governor
× Independent Individual (β5).32 I do find one significant coefficient on Republican Governor ×
Republican Individual (β3) when using male gender as the outcome variable. However, the sign on the
coefficient indicates that a Republican individual is less likely to be male (more likely to be female)
when a Republican governor wins relative to when a Democratic governor wins. But females are more
likely to believe in climate change as compared to males,33 so this placebo finding would tend to work
in the opposite direction than the main result on the paper. That is, if anything, the estimated effect of
a Republican governor on climate change beliefs of Republican individuals would be biased toward 0
due to this differential gender placebo effect. In summary, there is little evidence that baseline
covariates change differentially at the RD threshold based on individual political affiliation, again
adding credibility to the RD design.
Table 5. Falsification Tests: RD Specifications for Differential Effects
Outcome

White Age 45 or Older Male
(1)
(2)
(3)

Republican Governor (RG) .0149
RG × Rep. Individual
RG × Ind. Individual

−.0522

College
(4)

−.0457 .0572

p = .898 p = .376

p = .478 p = .366

.0314

−.0729* .0889

.0683

p = .704 p = .428

p = .056 p = .356

−.0413 .00322

.0769

p = .546 p = .98

p = .404 p = .686

.0330

Outcome

White Age 45 or Older Male
(1)
(2)
(3)

College
(4)

Order polynomial controls 1

1

1

1

BW

8.691

9.515

10.354 8.771

Optimal BW

X

X

X

X

Observations

2,769

3,169

3,543

2,763

No. of clusters (states)
31
33
34
31
Note. p-values are generated using the wild bootstrap procedure from Cameron et al. (2008).
Clustering is at the state level. All specifications include controls for race/ethnicity and gender,
individual partisan affiliation, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
The main potential threat to identification is that partisan affiliation is not exogenous. For example, the
election of a Republican governor could cause a realignment of individual partisan affiliation based
upon climate change beliefs. Previously Republican individuals who were believers in climate change
could reidentify as Independent and previously Independent individuals who were climate skeptics
could reidentify as Republican. I address this concern in four ways. First, I use the NSEE data to
thoroughly test for any discontinuities in partisan identification. Second, I leverage repeated crosssectional data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) to conduct a parallel test for
a discontinuous shift in partisan affiliation. Third, I use within-individual variation in a panel from CCES
to test whether individuals’ partisan identification changes based upon the party of their governor.
Finally, I analyze a subgroup of CCES individuals who initially reported a Republican affiliation in 2010
to see if defections from the Republican party are systematically related to the interaction of climate
change beliefs and the party of the governor.
Table 6 shows the results of local linear regressions where indicators for partisan affiliation are the
dependent variables. Columns 1 and 2 test for a discontinuous shift to Republican affiliation, columns 3
and 4 repeat the analysis for Democratic affiliation, and columns 5 and 6 show results for Independent
affiliation.34 I do not find any evidence that the election of a Republican governor discontinuously
affects the partisan affiliation of constituents. Because the optimal bandwidth in columns 1 and 2 for
the outcome of Republican affiliation is smaller than the bandwidths used in the main analysis of this
paper, I repeat the exercise in table OA3 using larger bandwidths.35 Again, I find no evidence that the
election of a Republican governor discontinuously causes individuals to shift toward or away from a
Republican identification. Finally, I look for heterogeneous impacts on partisan affiliation based on
education in columns 4–7 of table OA3. The concern here is that more highly educated individuals tend
to believe more in climate change as compared to less educated individuals; a heterogeneous impact
on partisan identification based on education could drive the main results of the paper. However, I do
not find evidence that a Republican governor discontinuously shifts partisan affiliation for less
educated or for more highly educated individuals.36

Table 6. Falsification Tests for Partisan Identification: Local Linear RD
Outcome

Rep.
Rep.
Dem.
Dem.
Ind.
Ind.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Conventional
.00337
−.0136 −.00544
.0074
−.0103
−.00558
(.0344)
(.0328) (.0386)
(.0451) (.0279)
(.0314)
Bias-corrected robust −.00777
−.0225 .00444
.00631 −.00692
−.00348
(.0427)
(.0370) (.0433)
(.0494) (.0323)
(.0329)
Kernel
Triangular Uniform Triangular Uniform Triangular Uniform
BW estimation
6.018
6.485
12.885
8.820
8.345
8.320
BW bias
12.519
12.720 24.841
15.612 15.368
17.654
Observations
8,680
8,680
8.680
8,680
8,680
8,680
Effective observations 2,144
2,373
2,739
2,769
2,759
2,759
Note. Outcomes are indicators for a given partisan affiliation (Republican in cols. 1–2, Democrat in cols. 3–4,

Independent in cols. 5–6). Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for conventional RD estimates are
clustered at the state level. Standard errors for bias-corrected RD estimates are Calonico et al.–robust, clustered
at the state level. All specifications include year fixed effects. “Effective observations” refers to the number of
observations within the estimation BW.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.

One disadvantage of the NSEE is the relatively small sample sizes. Another source of freely available
public opinion data is the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. The CCES has substantially larger
sample sizes than the NSEE. While the CCES has only sporadically asked questions about climate
change, it regularly asks detailed questions about partisan identification. I therefore assemble a
repeated cross-sectional data set of all publicly available common content survey data from 2006 to
2016 (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017). Appendix OB describes these data in more detail. Table
OA4 replicates Table 6 using the CCES data. I find no evidence that the election of a Republican
governor causes a discontinuous shift in constituents’ partisan identification with the large CCES
sample. Likewise, using the CCES data, I find no heterogeneous impacts of the party of the governor
based on education level.37
The 2010–14 CCES panel study surveyed 9,500 individuals in the election years of 2010, 2012, and
2014. Some of these individuals experience a change in the party of their governor throughout the
panel. I leverage this within-individual variation to estimate the impact of the election of a Republican
governor on an individual’s partisan identification. I first drop the 467 individuals who moved to a
different state in 2012 or 2014 because these individuals could be simultaneously choosing their
partisan identification and the party of their governor. I also drop the 610 individuals who do not
report partisan identification in 2010, 2012, or 2014. Of the remaining 8,423 individuals, approximately
9% change their partisan identification from 2010 to 2012 and 10% change their partisan identification
from 2012 to 2014. To test if the party of the governor affects individual partisan identification, I
estimate the simple fixed effects specification,
RP𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 RG𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,

(2)
where RPist is an indicator for an individual i residing in state s in year t who reports a Republican party
affiliation, RGist is an indicator for a Republican governor in state s at time t, αi is a time-invariant
individual specific fixed effect, and φt is a year fixed effect. Identification in this model comes from
individuals living in states that experience a change to the partisan identification of the governor. I find
no significant effect of a Republican governor on a constituent’s partisan identification using this
within-individual variation.38
Finally, I again use the 2010–14 CCES panel but restrict attention to the 2,573 individuals who report a
Republican partisan identity in 2010. Of these 2,573 initially reporting a Republican partisan identity,
154 switch to report either a Democratic or Independent identity in 2012. I then test for differential
affiliation switching with the linear probability model,

(3)

Switch𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 RG𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 GW𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 RG𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⋅ GW𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,

where Switchis is an indicator for individual i residing in state s who changed their partisan identity
from Republican in 2010 to either Democrat or Independent in 2012, RGis is an indicator for a
Republican governor in state s (in 2012), and GWis is an indicator for global warming belief (in 2012). A
positive and significant β3 could indicate that Republican voters who believe in climate change are
more likely to leave the Republican party when the governor is Republican compared to when the
governor is Democrat. However, I find a negative and statistically insignificant differential effect on
switching.39 In summary, I see no evidence that individuals change their reported partisan identity in
response to changes in the party of their governor.
Next, I look for manipulation in the vote margin by examining the density near the threshold. A
discontinuous change in the density of the forcing variable at the threshold could be indicative of
manipulation. If, for example, the Republican party could precisely forecast a close gubernatorial
election outcome and divert enough resources to just move a potential loser over the threshold, there
could be a violation of the continuity assumption of the RD design. As the treatment status is defined
at the state-year level, I first follow literature in showing the density of state-year level election
outcomes. As shown in figure 2, I do not find evidence of manipulation in election outcomes using the
state-year-level data.40 However, because the main result of the paper concerns differential effects
among individuals, I also examine the density of the individual-level observations. Figure 3A shows the
McCrary (2008) density plot for the entire sample; the McCrary test statistic is −0.0785 with a standard
error of 0.0629.41 Recalling the earlier concern that individuals could shift their reported partisan
identification based on the gubernatorial winner, I also show density plots when restricting the sample
to Democrats (fig. 3B), Republicans (fig. 3C), and Independents (fig. 3D). Again, the density appears
continuous through the threshold for these subsamples.42 I therefore fail to reject the null of
continuous density at the threshold with the individual-level data.

Figure 2. McCrary density plot of vote margin, state-year-level observations. This figure shows the density plot
of state-year election outcomes.

Figure 3. McCrary density plots of vote margin, individual-level observations. Panel A shows the density plot for
all respondents. Panel B includes only Democrat respondents. Panel C includes only Republican respondents.
Panel D includes only Independent respondents.

Finally, I test for placebo effects of the Republican Governor treatment on the lagged outcome of
global warming belief. Specifically, I estimate specifications where I use the global warming beliefs in
the years prior to an election. For example, a gubernatorial election took place in Minnesota in 2010.
Mark Dayton (Democrat) won the election and took office in January 2011. I pair this election result
with the individual-level data on global warming beliefs in Minnesota during the 4 years prior to this
election (2007–10). The intuition is that the messaging/policy position for a governor taking office in
2011 should not affect the global warming beliefs of individuals in the prior years. Table A2 shows local
linear results for the overall sample, and Table A3 shows results for the specification that tests for
differential effects by individual political affiliation, as given by equation (1). I find no evidence that
present election outcomes affect past global warming beliefs for the overall sample in Table A2.
Furthermore, I find no evidence that present election outcomes differentially affect past global
warming beliefs of individuals identifying with different political parties in Table A3. Overall, these
validity and falsification tests lend credibility to the claim that I am identifying effects from an
exogenous quasi-experiment.

2.5. Robustness Checks

Table OA5 shows results for several alternative samples to demonstrate the stability of the
estimates.43 I first show results with two narrower bandwidths (BW) in column 1 (50% of optimal BW)

and column 2 (75% of optimal BW). The results for these narrower bandwidths are qualitatively
unchanged from the baseline results in Table 3. In column 3 of table OA5, I limit the sample to only
include observations where the governor has been in power for at least a year. The rationale is that
there is a potential delay between when the governor takes office and when the governor’s policies
and/or messaging are internalized by constituents. Again, the results are quite similar. Table
OA6 shows local linear results when I limit the sample to observations where the governor has been in
the position for at least a year. Point estimates are larger in absolute value when limiting the sample in
this way than for the overall sample. In this case, I also find a statistically significant effect for the
overall sample; it appears that this is driven by the strong effect on Republican constituents. Therefore,
if anything, the effect of interest gets stronger when I limit the sample to exclude the first year that a
governor is in power.
I also widen the bandwidth to use more data further away from the discontinuity. Widening the
bandwidth requires adding higher levels of polynomial controls to the RD specification to control for
the smooth relationship between vote margin and global warming beliefs. However, there are an
infinite combination of bandwidths and parametric controls that one could choose. It is best to avoid
choosing bandwidth and order of the polynomial controls in an ad hoc manner. I therefore show
results for polynomial controls ranging from order 2 up to order 5, each time using the Calonico et al.
optimal-bandwidth calculation. Table OA7 shows that the main qualitative results are unchanged when
using higher-order polynomial controls.
The main question of analysis only asks whether an individual believes average temperatures have
been rising. As a policy concern, we may also be concerned with belief in anthropogenic climate
change. By definition, we have a larger potential influence on anthropogenic climate change as
compared to naturally occurring climate change.44 I therefore leverage the additional survey question,
“Is the earth getting warmer because of human activity such as burning fossil fuels, or mostly because
of natural patterns in the earth’s environment?” (Rabe and Borick 2017). I define a dichotomous
dependent variable as: 1 = human activity or combination of human activity and natural patterns, 0 =
natural patterns or does not believe in any global warming. For reference, approximately 58.7% of the
sample believes in anthropogenic climate change (74.7% of Democrats, 37.1% of Republicans, and
59.4% of Independents). Table 7 presents local linear results; columns 7–9 show that a Republican
governor affects the anthropogenic global warming beliefs of a Republican individual much the same
as found previously in Table 2 for general global warming beliefs. However, Table 7 also suggests that
there is a stronger effect of a Republican governor on Democratic individuals for anthropogenic global
warming beliefs as compared to the effect in Table 2 for general global warming beliefs of Democratic
individuals. Results for parametric specifications testing for differential effects on anthropomorphic
global warming beliefs based on individual political ideology are shown in Table 8; here I do not find
significant differential effects. I discuss the divergence in estimated effects on anthropogenic global
warming and general global warming beliefs and provide a potential explanation for the difference
in section 3.

Table 7. Additional Local Linear RD Results: Global Warming Is Due to Humans
Full
Democrat
Republican
Sample
Respondents
Respondents
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Conventional
−.0553** −.0607** −.0349 −.102**
−.113**
−.0767** −.118***
−.130*** −.0982**
(.0273)
(.0282)
(.0309) (.0473)
(.0459)
(.0385)
(.0379)
(.0359)
(.0423)
Bias-corrected robust
−.0599*
−.0660** −.0229 −.113**
−.124*** −.0873* −.133***
−.145*** −.0972*
(.0321)
(.0334)
(.0388) (.0478)
(.0475)
(.0447)
(.0462)
(.0440)
(.0547)
Race/ethnicity and
X
X
X
X
X
X
gender
Kernel
Triangular Triangular Uniform Triangular
Triangular Uniform Triangular
Triangular Uniform
BW estimation
8.163
8.043
7.647
7.560
6.923
7.409
7.701
7.520
9.399
BW bias
16.951
16.335
17.591 14.946
14.250
13.663
17.204
17.613
17.807
Observations
8,680
8,680
8,680
3,342
3,342
3,342
2,573
2,573
2,573
Effective observations
2,759
2,759
2,657
997
937
997
732
728
923
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for conventional RD estimates are clustered at the state level. Standard errors for bias-

corrected RD estimates are Calonico et al.–robust, clustered at the state level. All specifications include year fixed effects. “Effective observations” refers
to the number of observations within the estimation BW.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.

Table 8. Additional RD Specifications for Differential Effects: Global Warming Is Due to Humans
(1)
(2)
(3)
Republican Governor (RG) −.0679
−.0643
−.0757**
p = .262 p = .112 p = .042
RG × Rep. Individual
−.0476
−.0335
−.0109
p = .274 p = .400 p = .848
RG × Ind. Individual
.0386
.0670
.0796
p = .576 p = .348 p = .248
Rep. Individual
−.331*** −.334*** −.338***
p = .002 p = .002 p = .002
Ind. Individual
−.150*** −.163*** −.161***
p = .002 p = .002 p = .002
Order polynomial controls 1
1
1
BW
8.360
8.360
7.409
Optimal BW
X
X
State fixed effects
X
Year fixed effects
X
Observations
2,759
2,759
2,640
No. of clusters (states)
29
29
29
Note. p-values are generated using the wild bootstrap procedure from Cameron et al. (2008).
Clustering is at the state level. All specifications include controls for race/ethnicity and gender. All
specifications include linear controls.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
The CCES does contain a question about climate change in some years. As discussed in appendix OB,
there are several reasons why the CCES data could violate the continuity assumption of the RD design
and are not ideal for this application. Nonetheless, the CCES has many more observations and is a wellknown survey, so I briefly discuss RD results only for comparison purposes. Appendix OB describes the
CCES climate change question in more detail; I note that the question is not directly comparable to the
NSEE climate change question because the CCES bundles action together with belief while the NSEE
only inquires about belief. Estimating the preferred specification analogous to column 2 of Table 2, I
find a significant treatment effect. The election of a Republican governor is associated with a 6.8
percentage point decrease in the probability of believing that climate change is an issue that requires
action.45 Therefore, while less reliable than the NSEE analysis, I find a similar overall effect when
conducting a parallel analysis on the CCES climate change data.
As a final robustness check, I also use the 2010–14 CCES panel to estimate the fixed effects
specification given by equation (2) (replacing Republican partisan identification with an indicator for
climate change being an issue that requires action). Again, individuals living in states that experience a
change to the partisan identification of their governor provide the identifying variation in this model. I
estimate the model first including all individuals and then separately on subsamples of Democrat and

Republican individuals, as defined by reported 2010 partisan affiliation. As shown in Table A4, I find
results that qualitatively agree with the main RD results. For the overall sample and for the subsample
of Democrat respondents, there is no statistical effect of a Republican governor on an individual’s
belief that climate change is an issue that requires action. But, for Republican respondents, there is a
negative effect that is marginally significant (p-value=.086p-value=.086). A Republican governor
decreases the probability that a Republican individual believes climate change is an issue that requires
action by approximately 3.7 percentage points, providing some external validation of the NSEE RD
results.

3. Discussion

To summarize the results of section 2, the election of a Republican governor significantly impacts
global warming beliefs, relative to the election of a Democratic governor. Focusing on the primary
question of whether one believes that global warming is real, the effect is significant for Republican
individuals but is not for Democratic individuals. However, on the issue of anthropogenic climate
change, the effect is significant for the overall population and does not differ by political identification
of the respondent. Here, I provide some possible mechanisms to explain these results.
First, it is possible that there is an overall shift toward conservative values with the election of a
Republican governor. If this shift is stronger among Republican individuals than Democratic individuals,
it could be an explanation for the differential effects found in section 2. There is a question about
political ideology (ranging from very conservative to very liberal) on some waves of the
NSEE.46 Estimating a local linear regression analogous to those described in section 2.2 (with
“conservative” as the dependent variable), I find no evidence that there is an overall shift toward
conservatism with the election of a Republican governor. In the preferred specification analogous to
column 2 of Table 2, I find a bias-corrected point estimate of −0.0195 with a standard error of 0.0345.
On the other hand, I find a positive and significant effect in the full CCES sample. There, the election of
a Republican governor is associated with an approximate 5 percentage point increase in the probability
of a respondent identifying as conservative (significant at the 5% level). However, as described
in appendix OB, results from the CCES sample should be interpreted cautiously because there are some
discontinuities in baseline covariates. Nonetheless, it is possible that an overall shift toward
conservative values occurs with the election of a Republican governor, relative to the election of a
Democrat governor. Future research using other data could help determine to what extent governors
affect overall political ideology.
I also estimate equation (1), replacing global warming beliefs with an indicator for conservative.
Column 1 of Table A5 shows results for the NSEE sample, and column 2 shows results for the full CCES
sample. There is an insignificant effect of a Republican gubernatorial win on the likelihood of a
conservative ideology for Democrat individuals. Therefore, shifting ideology is unlikely to explain the
significant anthropogenic climate change results for Democratic individuals. Moreover, I do not find
any evidence that Republican individuals differentially shift toward more conservative political views
relative to Democrat individuals when a Republican governor wins a close election. The coefficient on
the differential effect (β3 from eq. [1]) is negative and statistically insignificant at conventional levels; if
anything, Republican individuals are less prone to shifting toward conservative values with the election
of a Republican governor. However, I note that Republican individuals display a substantially higher

baseline level of conservatism as they are approximately 70 percentage points more likely to report
conservative political views relative to a Democrat individual.
Evidence is growing that the media affects individuals’ pro-environmental beliefs and behavior. For
example, Jacobsen (2011) finds that the climate change documentary, An Inconvenient Truth,
substantially increased carbon offset purchases, and Beattie (2017a) finds that consumers become
more skeptical about climate change when the tone of newspaper coverage becomes more skeptical
about the issue. Relatedly, Beattie (2017b) finds that recent newspaper coverage with an
environmental tone causes households to be more environmentally friendly in their driving behavior.
Thus, differential engagement with local news based on partisan identification could partially explain
differential impacts of a Republican governor on climate change beliefs. CCES asks a question about
how informed respondents are about the news. Table A6 shows the results of a descriptive ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression of news engagement on observable characteristics. Interestingly,
relative to the omitted partisan category of Democrat, Republican individuals are 2.4 percentage points
more likely to report being well informed on the news, and Independent individuals are 1.8 percentage
points less likely to report being well informed on the news. While not a causal explanation, these
correlations suggest that engagement with the news could partially explain why Republican individuals
are more susceptible to changing their climate change beliefs.
Finally, that results differ among Democrat individuals for general global warming beliefs versus
anthropogenic global warming beliefs is somewhat puzzling. Why would communication from a
governor matter more for anthropogenic global warming beliefs than for general global warming
beliefs for Democrat respondents? Within the optimal bandwidth for Democrat individuals from the
main specification in column 4 of Table 2, 85.4% of Democrat respondents believe average
temperatures have been rising over the past 4 decades and 76.0% believe warming is occurring and at
least partially human caused. And, within the optimal bandwidth for Republican individuals from the
main specification in column 6 of Table 2, 50.4% of Republican respondents believe average
temperatures have been rising over the past 4 decades and 35.1% believe warming is occurring and at
least partially human caused. Table A7 summarizes observable characteristics for these four groups of
respondents, along with observable characteristics for individuals of both parties who do not believe in
any global warming. The numbers in each cell represent the proportion of respondents falling into a
given belief category that displays a certain characteristic.47 For Republicans, average observable
characteristics look quite similar across the three belief categories. However, for Democrats,
observable characteristics correlate with the global warming belief category. Democrats who believe in
only natural global warming are more likely to be nonwhite, female, and non-college-educated relative
to those who believe in human-caused global warming. The difference in the proportion of collegeeducated individuals is particularly striking. Also, there is a Republican governor in office 68% of the
time when a Democrat individual believes only in naturally caused global warming. These descriptive
differences suggest that the election of a Republican governor is not likely to cause a Democratic global
warming believer to completely deny global warming, but it could sway a marginal, especially lowereducated, Democrat to deny human causes of global warming. Interestingly, education does not seem
to play a similar role in the case of Republican individuals, which is consistent with prior findings in the
literature.

4. Conclusion

In summary, this paper provides evidence that political leaders’ messaging and policies can affect
global warming beliefs of constituents, and the effect is strongest among Republican individuals. I use
survey data from the United States to establish the causal effect of the political party of a governor on
the climate change beliefs of constituents. In a local linear RD specification on the subset of Republican
individuals, the election of a Republican governor decreases the absolute probability of a Republican
constituent believing in global warming by approximately 14 percentage points.48 Additional
specifications on the pooled data find evidence that a Republican governor differentially affects the
probability of global warming beliefs for individuals affiliated with different political parties; Republican
individuals become approximately 11 percentage points less likely to state that global warming is real
compared to Democratic individuals. These findings are robust to alternative specifications and sample
selection criteria.
Research suggests that individuals look to their political leaders to develop opinions on complex issues
such as climate change. Additionally, previous literature provides reason to expect that the political
party of the governor could differentially affect the global warming beliefs of Democratic and
Republican constituents. Political affiliation has been shown to be one of the most important
predictors of climate change beliefs, and political affiliation moderates the impact of scientific
information on climate change beliefs. It is also established that experimentally manipulating the
frame of how global warming information is conveyed to constituents typically has larger impacts on
Republican individuals than on Democratic individuals.
While this previous research helps justify why we may expect to find differential impacts on
Democratic and Republican individuals, the specific channel by which the political party of the
governor affects global warming beliefs remains largely an open question. One possibility is that
individuals listen to informational communication from the elected official when forming their climate
change beliefs. Another possibility, consistent with Broockman and Butler (2017), is that the simple
position adoption of the elected official is what sways opinion; the content of the message does not
matter. Future research focused on the specific mechanism(s) by which governors sway public opinion
on climate change would be valuable, especially considering the rather large estimated effect size for
Republican individuals. More generally, it would also be useful to further explore what other types of
public opinion governors may affect. Regardless of the transmission mechanism, the policy implication
is clear. It will likely remain difficult to convert climate change skeptics so long as their political leaders
publicly exhibit skeptical positions.
Previous research documents a growing polarization in climate change beliefs between Democrats and
Republicans. This paper provides one explanation why this could happen even as the scientific
consensus on the existence and impacts of climate change becomes stronger. Furthermore, in addition
to the scientific consensus, there is growing consensus around the economic argument for reducing
carbon emissions.49 As long as the political elite maintain skepticism of these economic arguments,
public opinion will likely continue to polarize, and meaningful climate policy may remain elusive.

Appendix. Additional Results Tables

Table A1. Tests for Differences in Proportion of Observable Characteristics by Treatment Status

Characteristic

Proportion, Left of the
RD Threshold
.488

Proportion, Right of the
RD Threshold
.477

College
educated

.474

.479

White

.858

.843

Age 45 or older .732

.729

Conservative

.417

.408

Republican

.273

.296

Democrat

.379

.363

Independent

.348

.342

Male

Difference in
Proportion (p-value)
.0109
(p = .618)
−.00468
(p = .830)
.0153
(p = .326)
.00325
(p = .868)
.00970
(p = .668)
−.0226
(p = .251)
.0164
(p = .437)
.00626
(p = .763)

n
2,144
2,140
2,144
2,123
1,930
2,144
2,144
2,144

Note. This table reports tests for differences in proportion of male, college educated, white, older, conservative,
Republican, Democrat, and Independent respondents for individuals just below the threshold (−6 ≤ vote margin
< 0) versus individuals just above the threshold (0 < vote margin ≤ 6).
Table A2. Falsification Test for Lagged Global Warming Beliefs: Local Linear RD
(1)
(2)
Conventional
−.0180
.0150
(.0196)
(.0276)
Bias-corrected robust −.0254
.00701
(.0222)
(.0297)
Kernel
Triangular Uniform
Optimal BW
X
X
BW estimation
7.351
6.844
BW bias
15.674
15.911
Observations
7,679
7,697
Effective observations 2,819
2,819
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for conventional RD estimates are clustered at the

state level. Standard errors for bias-corrected RD estimates are Calonico et al.–robust, clustered at the state
level. All specifications include year fixed effects. “Effective observations” refers to the number of observations
within the estimation BW.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.

Table A3. Falsification Test for Lagged Global Warming Beliefs: RD Specifications for Differential Effects

(1)
(2)
Republican Governor (RG)
.0620
.0391
p = .454 p = .748
RG × Republican Individual
−.0690 −.0542
p = .498 p = .584
RG × Independent Individual −.0824 −.0518
p = .11 p = .356
BW
7.479
10.051
Optimal BW
X
Observations
2,819
3,748
No. of clusters (states)
25
29
Note. p-values are generated using the wild bootstrap procedure from Cameron et al. (2008). Clustering is at

the state level. All specifications include controls for race/ethnicity and gender, individual partisan affiliation,
state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. All specifications include linear controls.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.

Table A4. Panel Fixed-Effects Results for Global Warming Action, CCES Data
Full Sample Democrat Respondents Republican Respondents
(1)
(2)
(3)
Republican Governor (RG) −.00802
.0115
−.0366*
p = .644
p = .532
p = .0860
Observations
24,940
9,531
7,601
Individuals
8,407
3,195
2,573
No. of clusters (states)
50
50
50
Note. p-values are generated using the wild bootstrap procedure from Cameron et al. (2008).
Clustering is at the state level. See app. OB for a description of the CCES global warming data.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
Table A5. Effects on Conservative Ideology: RD Specifications for Differential Effects
NSEE CCES
(1)
(2)
Republican Governor (RG) .0183

.0242

p = .906 p = .314
RG × Rep. Individual

−.0896 −.0625
p = .190 p = .118

RG × Ind. Individual

−.103

−.0348

p = .126 p = .336
Rep. Individual

.698*** .685***

NSEE
(1)

CCES
(2)

p < .001 p < .001
Ind. Individual

.217*** .178***
p < .001 p < .001

Order polynomial controls 1

1

BW

10.698 7.108

Optimal BW

X

X

Observations

2,949

98,526

No. of clusters (states)
32
38
Note. The dependent variable in this table is an indicator for self-reported conservative ideology. p-values are

generated using the wild bootstrap procedure from Cameron et al. (2008). Clustering is at the state level. All
specifications include controls for race/ethnicity and gender, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.

Table A6. News Engagement: Descriptive OLS Results, CCES Data
Informed on News
(1)
Rep. Individual

.0243***
(.00378)

Ind. Individual

−.0178***
(.00356)

Male

.0840***
(.00233)

College educated

.120***
(.00274)

Age 45 and older

.149***
(.00312)

African American

−.0724***
(.00569)

Asian

−.102***
(.00701)

Hispanic/Latino

−.126***
(.0132)

Mixed race and other .00736
(.00681)
State fixed effects

X

Informed on News
(1)
Year fixed effects

X

Observations

291,794

No. of clusters (states) 50
Note. The dependent variable in this table is an indicator for self-reported conservative ideology. Standard

errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. CCES = Cooperative Congressional Election Survey.
*p < .1.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.

Table A7. Description of Observable Characteristics by Partisan Affiliation and Global Warming Belief
Category
Democrat
Republican
Individual
Individual

Variable

Human
Only Natural
Human Caused Only Natural
Caused Global Global
No Global Global
Global
No Global
Warming
Warming
Warming Warming
Warming
Warming

White/Caucasian .819

.631

.737

.940

.954

.933

Male

.458

.320

.444

.457

.496

.517

College
educated

.551

.243

.271

.507

.450

.447

Age 45 or older .715

.757

.760

.691

.744

.787

Rep. governor .546
.680
.550
.619
.641
.647
Note. This table shows the proportion of respondents falling into a given belief category that display a certain

observable characteristic.
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1. I use the terms “climate change” and “global warming” interchangeably throughout the paper.
Global warming was the more popular term in the 1970s and 1980s but continues to appear in
the lexicon. “Climate change” often implies a wider range of impacts, such as increased climate
variability and sea level rise. The question on the survey that I analyze uses the term “global
warming.”

2. Political polarization is not limited to climate change. A literature documents growing political
polarization on a variety of economic and social issues (Evans 2003; Brewer 2005; Abramowitz
and Saunders 2008; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).
3. A growing literature seeks to quantify the economic effects of climate change. Dell et al. (2014)
provide a review of studies using weather shocks over time to identify economic impacts.
Examples of papers using this approach are Deschênes and Greenstone (2007, 2011), Schlenker
and Roberts (2009), Barreca (2012), Dell et al. (2012), Fisher et al. (2012), Barreca et al. (2016),
and Graff Zivin et al. (2018). Cragg and Kahn (1997) and Sinha et al. (2018) use discrete choice
models of locational choice to estimate willingness to pay for climate amenities. Similarly,
Albouy et al. (2016) use a hedonic framework to estimate household welfare losses due to
changing temperatures. A recent review on the economic costs of climate change is provided by
Tol (2018).
4. Similar to Costa and Kahn (2013b), I take political ideology as a set of prior beliefs. Given their
political affiliation/ideology, individuals are “treated” with a gubernatorial election result. I
provide evidence in sec. 2.4 to support this stance.
5. For a recent example with an application to climate change beliefs, see Shapiro (2016).
6. Kahn and Zhao (2017) examine how climate skepticism affects market outcomes including,
innovation, migration, and real estate prices.
7. One could recast the causal effect into an equivalent statement that a Democratic
gubernatorial win significantly increases the probability of a Republican constituent believing in
global warming. It is not possible to separate these two interpretations of the results. For clarity
in exposition, I maintain the interpretation of the causal effect of a close Republican
gubernatorial win throughout the paper.
8. Kousser and Tranter (2018) provide recent experimental evidence that Australian political
leaders can influence survey respondents. I am not aware of any prior quasi-experimental
research that identifies the impact of political elite on climate change beliefs.
9. Several notable exceptions that use quasi-experiments to identify the effect of elite positions
on public beliefs include Broockman (2009), Lenz (2009), and Carlsson et al. (2016). Some
experimental papers do control elite communication in a laboratory or field experiment setting
to establish causality (e.g.. Druckman 2004; Gerber et al. 2009, 2011; Druckman et al. 2013;
Broockman and Butler 2017). While such experimental studies have high internal validity, the
external validity of the results remains an open question.
10. For example, Costa and Kahn (2013b) show that political ideology matters for the response to a
electricity conservation “nudge,” Costa and Kahn (2013a) find that liberal households consume
less electricity, and Kahn (2007) finds that members of the Green Party make more
environmentally friendly transportation choices.
11. Cragg et al. (2013) highlight that the average League of Conservation Voters score (a popular
measure of how pro-environment a member of Congress is in their voting positions) for the
leadership of the Democrats in 2009 was 93% and that of the Republican leadership was 0%.
Multiple academic articles have detailed the history of climate change denial within the
conservative movement (e.g., McCright and Dunlap 2003; Jacques et al. 2008; Elsasser and
Dunlap 2013; Egan and Mullin 2017).

12. Perhaps the most well-known exceptions, Arnold Schwarzenegger (Republican governor of
California from November 17, 2003, to January 3, 2011) and Charlie Crist (Republican governor
of Florida from January 2, 2007, to January 4, 2011) advocated for policies to address climate
change. Observations from Florida in 2010 are not included in any of the analyses because Crist
switched to Independent in early 2010. Crist later switched to the Democatic Party in 2012.
Results are not sensitive to the exclusion of California under Schwarzenegger or Florida under
Crist.
13. There is an entire literature devoted to theories and evidence concerning the impact of elite
behavior on mass opinion. Some examples include Carmines and Stimson (1989), Brody (1991),
Zaller (1992), Hetherington (2001), Kam (2005), and Levendusky (2010).
14. Governors serve 2-year terms in these two states.
15. Governors are the elected executive heads of each US state. As detailed by Beland (2015),
governors wield considerable political power in the US political system as the head of the
executive branch. “The governor sets policies, prepares and administers a budget, recommends
legislation, signs laws, and appoints department heads. … Governors can veto state bills, which
gives them considerable control over policies” (Beland 2015, 199).
16. For New Hampshire and Vermont, t + 1 to t + 2 because of the 2-year terms.
17. Respondents were interviewed in English on landlines and cell phones (only landlines in 2008).
Phone numbers were chosen randomly from US numbers provided by a marketing company.
Both landlines and cell phones were called up to 10 times to reach a representative sample of
adult Americans (Rabe and Borick 2017). Other commonly utilized survey data sources are the
American National Election Studies (ANES) and the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey
(CCES). The ANES Time Series Study only asks global warming questions in 2012 and 2016 and is
hence not an appropriate data source for this research question. I present results using CCES
data as a robustness check in sec. 2.5 but discuss reasons why these data may be unreliable for
RD analysis in app. OB.
18. Of the respondents, 9,137 individuals provide global warming beliefs and have a Democratic or
Republican governor, 377 individuals report “other party” and are excluded, and 4 individuals
report “not sure” and are excluded. Thus, all respondents in the sample report Democrat,
Republican, or Independent for their political party affiliation. There are no other questions
concerning party affiliation in the NSEE.
19. Results are not sensitive to the inclusion of individuals who do not report race/ethnicity.
20. Note that Hispanics may be of any race in the census data, so they are also included in the race
percentages. In contrast, race/ethnicity categories in the NSEE are mutually exclusive.
21. I use a bin size of 1 and an integer bandwidth of 10, which is approximately equal to the optimal
bandwidth of the local linear regressions of the next subsection.
22. The states represented in the bins nearest the threshold are as follows: −6 ≤ vote margin ≤ −3:
Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Virginia, West Virginia, Washington. −3 ≤ vote margin < −0: Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota,
Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, Vermont, Washington. 0 ≤ vote margin < 3: Florida,
Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island. 3 ≤
vote margin < 6: Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, South Carolina.

23. I present evidence in sec. 2.4 to support the continuity assumption.
24. I also show results using a uniform kernel in table OA1.
25. When viewing RD as a nonparametric estimation problem, local linear regressions allow for an
arbitrary relationship between the running variable (vote margin) and the outcome (belief in
global warming) near the RD threshold. In contrast, point estimates and inference in the
parametric view of RD assume that the functional form of the regression relationship is a
known polynomial (possibly also linear). As noted by Lee and Lemieux (2010, 284), “the main
difference, then, between a parametric and nonparametric approach is not in the actual
estimation but rather in the discussion of the asymptotic behavior of the estimator as sample
sizes tend to infinity.” In practice, this means that bias correction of the RD treatment effect
should be used when viewing RD as a nonparametric problem. In contrast, conventional
parametric RD approaches would ignore the bias.
26. Calonico et al. (2018) expand the methods of Calonico et al. (2014b) to allow for covariates and
clustered data. I use the rdrobust package (Calonico et al. 2017) within Stata for all local linear
regressions, incorporating the default MSE-optimal bandwidth for clustered standard errors. I
use the “cluster” option for all local linear regressions, as described in Calonico et al.
(2017, 2018). See Bartalotti and Brummet (2017) for more detail on RD bandwidth selection
and estimation with clustered data.
27. For example, the conventional RD estimator with linear controls is given by the
specification, GWist=α+β⋅RGst+φ⋅VMst+λ⋅RGst⋅VMst+γXist+εistGWist=α+β⋅RGst+φ⋅VMst+λ⋅RGs
t⋅VMst+γXist+εist, where GWist is an indicator for belief in global warming, VMst is vote margin,
RGst is an indicator for a Republican governor holding office, and Xist includes baseline
covariates for individual i residing in state s in year t.
28. These results use the triangular kernel. Results using the uniform kernel are similar and shown
in table OA1. Results excluding year fixed effects are similar to those reported in Table 2 and
are available upon request. When limiting the sample to Independent respondents only, I find
positive coefficients that are statistically insignificant. The bias-corrected point estimates for
Independent respondents are 0.0459 (with a standard error of 0.0386) when using only year
effects as baseline controls and 0.0561 (with a standard error of 0.0355) when conditioning on
year effects, race/ethnicity, and gender. Because of these positive point estimates, I check
extensively for the possibility of endogenous partisan affiliation in sec. 2.4.
29. I use the rdrobust package to find the optimal bandwidth for the overall sample, conditioning
on survey year fixed effects, race/ethnicity, gender, and partisan affiliation. I use the uniform
kernel and cluster standard errors at the state level for the optimal bandwidth calculation. All pvalues in this section are calculated using the wild cluster bootstrap with 1,000 replications. The
wild cluster bootstrap is recommended for cluster-robust inference with a small number of
clusters (Cameron et al. 2008; Cameron and Miller 2015). I use the cgmwildboot command
from Judson Caskey’s website (https://sites.google.com/site/judsoncaskey/data) to obtain pvalues based on the bootstrap distribution of t-statistics.
30. Skovron and Titiunik (2015) recommend recalculating the optimal bandwidth for each placebo
outcome.
31. I also conduct a placebo test where I first regress global warming beliefs on all baseline
controls, generate fitted values for predicted beliefs, and then test for discontinuous predicted

beliefs (using the Calonico et al. optimal bandwidth). I find no evidence of discontinuous
predicted beliefs. These results appear in table OA2.
32. For each outcome in Table 5, I use the Calonico et al. optimal bandwidth. I use linear controls
and the uniform kernel. I use race/ethnicity, gender, and year fixed effects as covariates for the
bandwidth calculation.
33. See Table 3, for example.
34. In each case, individuals identifying with the corresponding outcome party of interest are coded
as 1 and all others are coded as 0. I use the Calonico et al. optimal bandwidth in all
specifications.
35. Columns 1–3 use the optimal bandwidths from the analogous specifications for the outcome of
global warming belief.
36. While not statistically significant, signs on the point estimates in cols. 4–5 of table OA3 run
counter to the argument that less educated individuals are pushed to the Republican party and
more educated individuals are pushed away from the Republican party with the election of a
Republican governor.
37. Point estimates are small in magnitude and never statistically significant. These results are
available by request.
38. The coefficient β1 is estimated at −0.00725 with a p-value of 0.27 (using the wild cluster
bootstrap with 1,000 replications).
39. I condition on race/ethnicity, gender, and education. The coefficient β3 is estimated at −0.0844
with a standard error of 0.0872 (clustered at the state level).
40. The McCrary test statistic is −0.0827 with a standard error of 0.120.
41. Consistent with fig. 1, I use a bandwidth of 10 and a bin size of 1 for the McCrary density plots
shown in fig. 3. I use the user-written DCdensity command in Stata (McCrary 2008).
42. The relevant McCrary test statistics (with standard errors in parentheses) are: −0.125 (0.102)
for Democrats, −0.0827 (0.120) for Republicans, and −0.0243 (0.107) for Independents.
43. Each of these specifications uses linear controls. Additional results using higher-order
polynomial controls are similar and available upon request.
44. A policy to decrease naturally occurring global warming would require geoengineering
solutions. Moreover, it is not clear that the public would support costly policies to address
natural warming.
45. The bias-corrected point estimate is −0.0678 with a standard error of 0.0213 (clustered at the
state level). As discussed in app. OB, there is a discontinuous change in partisan affiliation in the
CCES climate change data at the RD threshold. Therefore, it is not advisable to examine
heterogeneity by partisan affiliation in these data.
46. Political ideology appears on the NSEE beginning in the fall 2010 survey wave. I create an
indicator for “conservative,” which equals 1 if the respondent identifies as “very conservative”
or “somewhat conservative” and 0 if the respondent identifies as “moderate,” “somewhat
liberal,” or “very liberal.”
47. For example, among Democrats who believe in human caused global warming, 81.9% are white.
48. Again, an equivalent statement is “the election of a Democratic governor increases the absolute
probability of a Republican constituent believing in global warming by approximately 14
percentage points.”

49. Economists typically favor placing a price on carbon via a tax or tradable permit system. For an
example of survey evidence of climate change economics experts, see Howard and Sylvan
(2015).
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